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During the Second World War, the Japanese government and private sector 
searched for and implemented new mechanisms for coordination and motivation.  One 
of these was sangyo hokokukai (sanpo).  Sanpo unit was basically an organization of 
the employer and employees of each firm, which held meetings to moderate labor 
relations. Due to the government policy to promote sanpo units, around 70% of the total 
workers in Japan were organized into sanpo units in the early 1940s.    As the members 
of labor unions and the workers of the companies which had factory committees, were 
only 7 % and 5% of the total workers in 1936 respectively, sanpo was the first large scale 
mechanism for Japanese employees to voice.  In this paper, I examined the role of 
sanpo, using prefecture level data and firm level data, based on a framework 
integrating the “voice view” of unionism and the transaction cost economics.  It was 
found that sanpo reduced the participation rate in labor disputes, and enhanced labor 
productivity at least in some period.      
1.Introduction 
            The Second World War had a tremendous impact on the Japanese economy and a 
vast amount of resources were mobilized for the war effort.  In managing the war 
economy under a rapidly deteriorating environment, the Japanese government and 
private sector searched for and implemented new mechanisms for coordination and new 
incentives. These included control associations (toseikai) that acted as intermediaries to 
pass information back and forth between the government and firms, decentralization of 
decision-making, manipulation of production incentives using price controls, 
intervention in the corporate governance structure, and mediation of syndicate loans by 
The National Financial Control Association1.   
In addition to these measures, which basically addressed the upper layers of the 
economic system, a new innovation was introduced at the shop floor level. This new 
innovation was called sangyo hokokukai or sanpo.  Sanpo itself was a three-layered 
organization.  At the bottom, there was a sanpo unit at each establishment or each 
firm. The sanpo units were organized into regional associations, which, in turn, were 
under the Dai Nihon Sangyo Hokokukai, the national center of the sanpo movement, 
which was controlled by the government.  Here, we focus on the sanpo unit.  The 
sanpo unit played a number of roles, including holding employee meetings, organizing 
recreational activities, and rationing of food and clothes.         
      T h e  sanpo system has long been the subject of research in Japan since the early 
postwar period.  Kazuo Okochi, who led the labor research field in postwar Japan, 
proposed several possible interpretations of sanpo.  First, in a book published in 1955, 
he gave a negative assessment of sanpo: “Sangyo hokokukai formerly dominated the 
whole country, but it proved to be ineffective as an organizational basis for the war 
economy in the long run.”2    Somewhat in contrast to this position, in another article in 
1971, he argued, “It was appropriate to attach importance to workers organizations and 
to have issues including employment conditions discussed at employee meetings, in 
order to improve communication between employers and employees, improve work 
incentives and enhance productivity.” This evaluation corresponds to the view that 
employee meetings continued to be the core of the sanpo organization throughout the 
war period.  Also, he gave sanpo the credit for maintaining order on the shop floor 
during the final stages of the war, and wrote, “(the role of sanpo) was related to the 
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 1  sudden emergence of company unions after the war.”  Okochi’s second view is 
noteworthy, in that it can be regarded as a forerunner of “voice view” on the role of labor 
unions.    
      The “voice view” of unionism refers here to the view proposed by C. Brown, R. 
Freeman and J. Medoff that a labor union enhances productivity through making the 
collective voice of workers effective3. First, if the voice of workers is listened to, this 
reduces the turnover of workers as complaints are resolved, thereby saving on training 
costs and promoting the formation of firm-specific skills. Second, it promotes 
participation and work incentives for workers through sharing information with the 
employer.    Third, it enables workers to transmit local information on the shop floor and 
express their preferences to their employer frankly.       
      As progressive it was, Okochi’s second view has not subsequently been adopted 
by later research on sanpo.  Andrew Gordon, in his influential book, claimed that 
employee meetings under the sanpo system failed to achieve either harmony between 
employer and employees or equalization among employees, which were the objectives 
pursued during the Sino-Japanese War, and it also failed to enhance work incentives, 
rate of attendance or productivity, which were the objectives during the Pacific War4. 
Yutaka Nishinarita argues that as sanpo could not successfully bring about solidarity 
among workers in the period from 1938 to 1940, it was reorganized into an organization 
emulating the army, but it damaged the function that mediated labor relations, contrary 
to the intention of the government5 Kazuro Saguchi also gives a negative evaluation of 
                                                  
3 Brown and Medoff, “Trade Union in the Production Process,” Freeman and Medoff, 
What do Unions Do?    In these works they applied Albert Hirschman’s framework of 
“voice” and “exit” (Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Royalty) to the analysis of labor unions.   
After these seminal works, many empirical studies have been done not only on the U.S., 
but also on other countries including the U.K. and Japan. Most of the research has 
confirmed the voice view.    For example, Rees found that grievance procedure lowers 
quit rate, using the data of public school teachers in New York State in the 
1970s(“Grievance Procedure Strength”). Wilson and Peel report that, based on the data 
of U.K. engineering and metal firms in the 1980s, employee participation through labor 
unions, formal schemes for employee participation in decision-making as well as 
profit-sharing, make absenteeism and quit rate lower (“The Impact on Absenteeism and 
Quits”). Muramatsu found that, based on Japanese industry-level data, labor unions 
lowered the quit rate (“Rishoku Kodo to Rodo Kumiai”). He also reported that trade 
unions increased productivity mainly by reducing the quit rate. This finding was based 
on Japanese industry-level data from the 1970s (“Trade Unions and Productivity”). Also, 
see Lazear, Personal Economics for Managers, and Baron and D. Kreps, Strategic 
Human Resource Management. 
4 Gordon, Evolution of Labor Relations.  
5 Nishinarita, Kindai Nihon Roshi Kankeishiyu.     
 2  the actual function of sanpo, though he ranks it highly in ideological terms6.   
     In this paper, a reconsideration of the role of sanpo in line with Okochi’s second 
assessment, from the standpoint of voice view, will be undertaken.  In applying voice 
view to wartime Japan, the insights provided by transaction cost economics will be 
incorporated.  Oliver  Williamson  made  a  useful observation regarding the voice view in 
his book: “Whereas the voice view of unionism attributes beneficial governance features 
to union organization quite generally, the transaction (or governance) approach predicts 
that they will vary with the continuity needs of the parties,” and “those continuity needs 
are greatest where human assets are more highly specific.”7 Interestingly, as discussed 
in section 2 of this paper, in late 1930s Japan, while the government promoted sanpo, it 
implemented two other labor policies at the same time, namely, restricting inter-firm 
labor transfers and obliging each firm to train workers.  These policies imply the 
imposition of a restriction on the “exit” option of workers, and the formation of 
firm-specific skills. Therefore, according to the voice view and by integrating the insight 
of transaction economics, we can predict that the role of the collective voice of workers 
became more significant due to these policies.  And we can form the hypothesis that 
the voice mechanism was adopted and advanced by the sanpo system. This hypothesis 
will be examined using quantitative data as well as historical  documents.                 
 
2. Wartime labor control and its consequences 
     Japan entered into a full-scale war with China in July 1937, when the Japanese 
economy was already close to full employment as a result of around four years of 
expansion.  The war stimulated the economy further, which in turn brought about a 
large increase in the demand for labor.  Employment in the manufacturing sector, 
which had been 1.66 million in 1931 and 2.56 million in 1936, rose to 3.84 million in 
1940.  The increase in employment numbers was especially sharp in the machinery 
industry, which was closely related to munitions.    It increased from 0.46 million to 1.28 
million between 1936 and 1940, an increase of 29.3% per year (Figure 1). 
                                                  
6 Saguchi, Nihon ni okeru Sangyo Minshushugi. One exception is Sakiko Shioda,” 
Sangyo Hokoku Undo no Jittai to Kino,” which pointed out that sanpo was effective in 
preventing labor disputes, although it failed to induce workers to cooperate to increase 
production or improve labor control.    The view of Makoto Sakurabayashi, Sangyo 
Hokokukai concerning the function of sanpo, is not clear, except in the final stage of the 
w a r .       
7 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p.257. K. Noda reports that, 
based on data of Japanese manufacturing firms in the 1990s, labor unions had a 
positive effect on firm productivity only if the employees had accumulated firm-specific 
human capital (“Rodo Kumiai to Seisansei”). 
 3            This sharp increase in the demand for labor brought about serious problems in the 
labor market and in labor relations.  First, was the emergence of a substantial 
shortage of skilled workers, which caused active poaching of skilled workers among 
firms.  Second, as a sudden rise in inflation occurred and increases in the nominal 
wage lagged behind, there was accelerating labor unrest over demands for wage 
increases.  There was a marked increase in large-scale disputes in particular, and the 
number of workers involved in disputes was 3.7 times greater in the first half of 1937 
than it had been in the latter half of 1936, although the days lost were still fewer than 
in the 1920s. The surge of labor disputes suddenly subsided when the Sino-Japanese 
War broke out in July 1937, mainly because of the patriotic mood caused by the war8. 
This situation continued until the end of 1938 (Figure 2). 
     Meanwhile, as part of its preparations for a prolonged war, the government was 
drawing up a long-term plan for production capacity expansion.  The government 
regarded the shortage of skilled workers as a serious problem, and took two measures, 
namely, promotion of worker training and regulation of inter-firm labor transfers.  
With respect to training, the government established three national training centers, 
and provided subsidies to regional and private training centers.  The annual objective 
was to train 750 skilled workers at the national training centers and 1000 at the 
regional and private centers9.  However skilled workers were still in short supply.  In 
1939, based on the National Mobilization Law, the Factory and Establishment Skilled 
Workers Training Act was passed.    Under the Act, the government had the authority to 
order a private establishment with more than 200 male employees older than 16 years, 
to train a certain number of employees as skilled workers.  To begin with, private 
companies operating in 22 industries including mining, metal, machinery etc. were 
designated to train workers10. 
     Two points concerning this training policy should be mentioned.  First, whereas 
at first the government had determined that training centers would operate outside the 
firm, it changed its policy to allow training inside the firm.  Second, the Factory and 
Establishment Skilled Workers Training Act clearly set out the attributes the skilled 
workers were expected to acquire.  That is, “skilled workers should have a broad 
technical expertise in the production area of the establishment they work at, and should 
be able to perform their work correctly without supervision from a superior,” and “they 
should not be so-called specialized workers whose skills are confined to a very limited 
                                                  
8 Kyochokai, Rodo Nenkan, 1938, pp.195-196; Ministry of Welfare, Rodo Jiho, 1938 July, 
p.14.  
9 Asahi Shinbunsha, Asahi Keizai Nenshi, 1938, p.496 
10 Sumiya ed. Nihon Shokugyo Kunren , pp.295-297. 
 4  area.”11  Even before the Sino-Japanese War, discussions were held among policy 
makers and researchers on the types of skilled workers that should be produced 
through such a training program, namely, whether general skilled workers or 
specialized skilled workers were preferable.  The Act clearly indicated a preference for 
training general skilled workers.  Also, it is notable that this concept of the skilled 
worker closely resembles that of the worker with “intellectual skill” in contemporary 
Japanese manufacturing industries12.  Summing up these two points, we can say that 
during the war, the government aimed at creating workers with general and intellectual 
skills inside the firm.     
      The regulations covering inter-firm labor transfers, the other policy measure 
introduced to address the shortage of skilled workers, will now be described.  In 1939, 
at the time when the Factory and Establishment Skilled Workers Training Act was 
introduced, the Employment Restriction Act was passed.  This Act was also based on 
the National Mobilization Law.    According to the Act, the employment of male workers 
aged 15 to 50 years, who had been employed by another employer for more than three 
months, including those who left that employer within six months, had to be approved 
by the chief of the public job introduction office13.   
        It should be noted that there was a reason why these two Acts were introduced at 
the same time in addition to their common purpose, namely, coping with the shortage of 
skilled workers.  The workers who were restricted from transferring from one firm to 
another under the Employment Restriction Act included those who had been 
undergoing training according to the Factory and Establishment Skilled Workers 
Training Act for more than three months and those who had completed their training 
within past six months.  This was to prevent trainees from being poached by another 
firm14.    The intention of the Act was to prevent a firm from taking unfair advantage of 
the training provided by another firm, and thereby created greater incentives for a firm 
to train its own workers.    In this sense, the restriction placed on transferring from one 
company to another supported the training policy. 
     Meanwhile,  labor  disputes,  which  had  subsided following the outbreak of the war, 
flared up again in 1939 (Figure 2)15.  In a 1939 report, the Police Bureau of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs attributed the unrest to a decline in “the cooperative spirit 
                                                  
11 Kyochokai, Senji Rodo Jijo,  pp.118-119.    
12 Koike, The Economics of Work, pp.63-74; Koike, “Learning and Incentive Systems in 
Japanese Industry.”     
13 Asahi Shinbunsha, Asahi Keizai Nenshi, 1939, pp.293-294. 
14 Hirosaki, Nihon no Romu Kanri , p.545   
15 Showa Kenkyukai, Rodo Shintaisei, pp.137-8. 
 5  under the emergency” between employers and employees due to the prolongation of the 
war, workers’ apprehension about life due to economic controls and inflation, and the 
decline in incomes due to labor controls.16 In another report issued two years later, the 
Police Bureau documented the influence of labor controls in more detail: “As labor 
controls have aimed at mobilizing the labor force and its appropriate allocation, these 
controls have basically focused on workers.    Consequently, workers have felt pressures, 
and some of them complain of the partiality of the government policy, which in turn has 
substantially decreased worker morale and efficiency.  Concerning the Workers 
Transfer Restriction Act and National Labor Certificate Law, many workers thought 
that these acts have tied them down at a single work place.    Therefore, while inter-firm 
labor transfers have been restricted, complaints from workers regarding labor 
conditions have been building up, and as a result, efficiency has declined due to explicit 
or implicit sabotage and a decrease in worker morale.”17         
     These observations by the Police Bureau are noteworthy in relation to the 
framework discussed in section 1. They imply that as labor controls restricted the option 
of workers to exit from a firm, their complaints had been mounting inside the firm, 
which in turn caused labor disputes and a decline in efficiency. A researcher also 
reported on the Employment Restriction Act in 1940: “Prior to this, conflicts could be 
resolved by essentially moving them out of the firm. However, the restrictions imposed 
on changing companies have confined the conflict to within the firm, which led to 
disputes and sabotage everywhere.”18  Another researcher pointed out, “As a result of 
various restrictive acts, workers have been unable to choose what factories they work 
at.”  Exacerbating the situation, wages were frozen, and as a result, “The general 
disposition of workers has worsened, which in turn has had a negative influence on 
production efficiency, and resulted in a mood conducive to acts of sabotage”19                  
 
3.Promotion of sanpo by the government 
      The rise in the number of labor disputes in 1937 compelled the government to 
examine existing labor relation measures, which resulted in the introduction of the 
sanpo  system20.  The idea of sanpo originated in a document entitled “Emergency 
Measures for Moderating Labor Relationships,” drafted by the Police Department of 
Aichi Prefecture in October 1937.  This document proposed the setting up of factory 
                                                  
16 Shakai Ubdo no Jokyo , 1939, pp.656-7. 
17 Ibid, 1941, p.635. 
18 Hirano, “Jikyoku ka Rodo Jijo,” p.131     
19 Nishi, “Rodo Sogi no Gaikan,” p.280.   
20 Ujihara and Hagiwara, “Sangyo Hokoku Undo.”     
 6  committees, in which representatives of the employer and employees participated, in 
order to resolve and prevent labor disputes.  In pre-war Japan there was no legal 
framework to protect labor union activities, and accordingly union members were a 
small proportion of the total workforce.    The ratio of union members was only 6-8 % in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s21. Some large companies had factory committees that 
allowed discussion between employers and workers about labor conditions. However, 
the numbers of workers participating in this system were relatively few. According to 
the survey by the Ministry of Welfare in July 1936, there were 274 committees, and 
315,436 workers were involved22, which represented only 5.1 % of the total workforce in 
1936.  The document issued by the Aichi Prefecture Police Department wanted to see 
an expansion of the factory committees. On the other hand, employers were opposed to 
the policy promoting these committees, as it presupposed that there was a pre-existing 
conflict of interest between employers and employees. While there some ideological 
differences between the government and employers remained, in August 1938, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare instructed prefectural governors 
to promote the setting up of sanpo units to facilitate meetings between employers and 
employees at all factories23. Actually, many sanpo units were established as a result of 
the sanpo promotion policy. The proportion of workers participating in sanpo (members 
of sanpo /total workers) exceeded 40% at the end of 1939, and reached 70% by the end of 
1941 (Figure 3).    As stated below, the position of sanpo in the labor policy changed over 
time during the war, but sanpo continued to be a dominant labor organization, at least 
in terms of the number of the members, until it was dissolved after the war ended.   
     While the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare at first placed 
importance on the proper management of labor relations at sanpo meetings, from late 
1939 they began to modify their official view.  They announced an alternative official 
view that work was a national duty and sanpo meetings were a way of fulfilling that 
duty.  As the document pointing to this change in policy, precedent literature has 
focused on “Outline of the Sanpo M o v e m e n t , ”  i s s u e d  b y  the Labor Bureau of the 
Ministry of Welfare (November 1939)24.  It is true that the document clearly stated, 
“the discussions on labor conditions during the early stages of the sanpo movement were 
due to a misunderstanding regarding the essence of the sanpo meeting.” However, at 
the same time, the sanpo meeting itself was still strongly emphasized in this document. 
                                                  
21 Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo Iinkai ed. Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo, vol. 10, p.424. 
22 Social Bureau of Ministry of Domestic Affairs ed. Rodo Jiho, December 1936, 
pp.374-9. 
23 Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyujo ed. Taiheiyo Senso, p.40. 
24 Kanda, Shiryo Nihon Gendaishi, p.597.   
 7  Also, it was still thought to be desirable for members to talk frankly about their 
experiences, research, original ideas, opinions and desires.   
     In November 1940, the Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai was established as the 
national center of the sanpo movement, and was a part of the New Economic System in 
a broad sense.25  The policy of the Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai on the sanpo unit 
conformed to the “Outline of the Sanpo Movement” mentioned above.  In fact, a 
document issued by the Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai, “The New Aims of the Sanpo 
Movement Facing the War” written in September 1941, has been frequently cited as 
evidence indicating the change in the nature of the sanpo system.26  T h e  m a j o r  t h r u s t  
of the document was to reorganize the sanpo unit into a hierarchical organization 
corresponding to the firm’s organization, emulating the army, and to make sanpo 
meetings a supplementary organ of authoritarian control.  Makoto Sakurabayashi 
wrote that “Downgrading the meeting to a supplementary organ, this reform formally 
as well as actually abolished the sanpo’s function of managing or changing labor 
relations focusing on labor conditions.”27  However, this document did not reject the 
idea that sanpo meetings played a role in the moderation of labor relations, and also 
stressed that sanpo meetings should be utilized more effectively. 
     As a matter of fact, the government authorities retained high expectations that 
sanpo would continue to function as a moderating influence on labor relations, and 
greatly valued the role it was actually playing.  A report by a judge of the Nagoya 
Regional Court, Hisaaki Okagaki, contains a lot of useful information about the views of 
the government authorities on sanpo.28    A document issued by the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police wrote about the functions of the sanpo system as follows:   
 
It is abundantly clear that the sanpo movement has spawned many sanpo units at 
individual establishments in a year or so, and has been has been exerting a positive 
influence on various aspects of the industrial labor relations and society. -- 
Omission-- Consequently, harmonization between employers and employees, saving 
money and resources, and preventing industrial accidents have been gradually 
realized, which, in turn, has lifted morale in the work place.  These are desirable 
phenomena.  Also, this positive state of affairs has been directly reflected in 
production activities to enhance efficiency, improve work processes, upgrade 
                                                  
25 Concerning the New Economic System, see Okazaki, “Corporate Governance.”       
26 Kanda, Shiryo Nihon Gendaisshi, p.604; Sakurabayashi, Sangyohokokukai, p.12; 
Nishinarita, Kindai Nihon no Roshi Kankei, pp.400-1. 
27 Sakurabayashi, Sangyo Hokokukai, p.12. 
28 Okagaki, Shina Jihen kano Rodo Undo.  
 8  technology, and develop a cooperative working environment.  It is notable that 
these have had a marked positive effect on technology and production. Furthermore, 
concerning labor management, improvements in personnel administration, 
rationalization of labor conditions, establishment of welfare organizations and 
communication have been realized. These outcomes have been effective in 
addressing complaints, obviating conflicts and resolving class confrontations.29    
 
We can say that, aside from the official line, the Metropolitan Police recognized that 
class confrontation was a reality, and that the sanpo system had been helping to resolve 
workers’ complaints including labor conditions as well as contributing to the 
improvement  of  productivity.           
     On the other hand, Okagaki’s report also cited articles critical of sanpo.  An 
article written by Masami Matsuzaki, a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Welfare, falls into 
this category.  It is true that this article criticized management of sanpo meetings at 
some firms, but it concluded “generally speaking, we cannot deny that due to the 
establishment of sanpo meetings, opportunities for frank discussions have been given to 
employers and employees, which have generated a sense of personal trust between the 
two parties and have been helping to raise morale in the work place.  Specifically, it is 
clearly observed that active utilization of sanpo meetings has been effective in 
preventing and resolving labor disputes”.30 As evidence, Matsuzaki wrote, “by referring 
to the fact that labor disputes have frequently occurred at those factories where the 
sanpo movement is relatively inactive and both employers and employees are 
indifferent to the holding of sanpo meetings, we can presume that sanpo meetings are 
effective in preventing and resolving labor disputes.”31   
     Finally, Okagaki’s report cited a document issued by the Police Bureau of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, “Sangyo Hokoku Undo Gaikan” (An Overview of the Sanpo 
M o v e m e n t ) .   I n  t h i s  d o c u m e n t ,  the Police Bureau concluded that sanpo had three 
major effects.  First, sanpo contributed to industrial productivity: “It is thought to be 
one of the achievements of the sanpo movement that under the prevailing bad social 
and economic conditions, productivity has been maintained at the present level, and 
that some establishments are even achieving higher levels of productivity than before.”    
Second, sanpo has contributed to both preventing and resolving labor disputes: “The 
gap between prices and wages, which is the major cause of labor disputes, is presently 
                                                  
29 Ibid, p.485. 
30 Ibid, p.550. 
31 Ibid, p.570. 
 9  the widest it has ever been, and there is ample justification for an explosion in the 
number of labor disputes.  However, labor disputes have been kept down to a 
reasonable level.  This is partly because of the wartime emergency situation, but we 
need to recognize that the sanpo movement convinced employers and employees that 
disputes were anti-state, and that the causes of disputes have also been removed in 
some cases by utilizing sanpo meetings.    Also, we can regard as an achievement of this 
movement the fact that there are many cases where the expansion of disputes was 
checked and they were resolved quickly, owing to the sanpo meetings.”  Third, “as the 
sanpo movement requires the establishment of personal trust between employers and 
employees, it has increased opportunities for contacts between them.    As a result, trust 
and understanding have gradually grown, which in turn has improved the overall 
atmosphere in work places.”32                
        All of the documents cited above indicate that the government authorities had high 
expectations of and positively evaluated the functions of sanpo, especially the capacity 
of  sanpo meetings to prevent disputes and to enhance productivity, at least until 
1940-1941. Moreover, this kind of evaluation was not limited to government authorities.   
Tadao Kikukawa, the ex-general secretary of the Japan Federation of Labor, the largest 
federation of labor unions, argued against the position that sanpo was not only 
ineffective in preventing labor disputes but also caused them.  He said, “Facts clearly 
indicate that labor disputes have been prevented by the sanpo movement.  In those 
prefectures where the sanpo movement has proliferated, for example in Tokyo, the 
number of disputes has been declining over the last two years.  On the other hand, in 
those prefectures where disputes have increased since last year, the growth of the sanpo 
movement has generally been limited.”33     
 
4.Function of sanpo   
            In order to see how sanpo worked, first let us look at frequency of sanpo meetings 
(Table 1).  This table is based on a survey of sanpo units conducted by the Ministry of 
Welfare in September 1940. According to the table, the average frequency of sanpo 
meetings was about 0.3 to 0.5 per month.  In other words, meetings were held every 
two to three months.  It is true that there were a substantial number of sanpo units 
that had only held one meeting since their establishment34, but on the other hand there 
were sanpo units which held meetings fairly frequently.  Then the question is how the 
                                                  
32 Ibid, pp.576-578.,   
33 Ibid, pp.555-556. 
34 Saguchi, Nihon niokeru Sangyo Minshushugi, p.178. 
 10 meetings worked, or more specifically whether they worked as a voice mechanism for 
employees.     
     Although material showing how sanpo meetings worked is limited, Andrew 
Gordon discussed this issue focusing on the Ishikawajima Dockyard. Using the 
periodical issued by Ishikawajima Jikyokai, the sanpo unit in question, he argued that 
the meetings addressed only a narrow range of innocuous issues, including a lecture 
series on patriotic spirit, a new discussion center, vacation days, supply of breakfast 
after all-night work, and so on35.  On the other hand, we have a case where sanpo 
meetings played a more substantial role, the example of Nippon Hassoden Co. (Nippon 
Electricity Generation and Transmission).  Nippon Hassoden was established in April 
1939 as a semipublic company and, under government supervision, it had a monopoly 
on the generation and transmission of electricity.  In December of that year, a sanpo 
unit was organized at Nippon Hassoden with 13000 members 36 .  The sanpo 
headquarters was located at the company head office, and 25 sanpo branches (shibu) 
were situated at company branches and large establishments.  In addition, there were 
102 sanpo sub-branches (bunkai) under the sanpo branches.     
Meetings at sanpo sub-branches were held every two months, while meetings at 
sanpo branches were held every four months.  After a meeting, the company manager 
who was in charge of the company branch or establishment, made a decision on each 
issue that had been discussed. The decision options were “acceptance,”(saiyo) 
“examination,” (kenkyu) “rejection,”(fusaiyo) “agreement,”(ryokai) and “transmission to 
a working group” (dentatsu)37.  The number of issues discussed at sanpo branch 
meetings and sanpo sub-branch meetings up until the end of September 1940 was 169 
and 2154, respectively.  It is notable that out of 169 issues discussed at branch 
meetings, 5 were on wages, and 21 were on allowances including family allowance, 
inflation allowance, residential allowance, while various innocuous issues were also 
discussed as in the case of Ishikawajima. Although none of the applications for a wage 
increase or allowance had been approved by the end of September 1940, it is noteworthy 
that at least the sanpo meetings made a positive contribution to information sharing on 
the wage and allowance issues. Furthermore, Hassoden, the periodical of Nippon 
Hassoden Sanpo, reported that employees continued to request allowances for family, 
                                                  
35 Gordon, Evolution of Labor Relations, p.304. 
36 Shukan Romu Jiho (Labor Weekly) vol.115 (May 8, 1941), pp.2-13. The following 
description is based on this source, unless noted otherwise.   
37 The working group chose acceptance, rejection or examination. In the case of sanpo 
sub-branch meetings, there was another alternative, asking for instructions from the 
sanpo branch meeting.   
 11 large cities and inflation at subsequent sanpo meetings38, and finally in October 1941, 
the company introduced a monthly family allowance of 2 yen per dependent39.         
     Because  the  source  material  for  detailed case studies is limited and the results are 
mixed, it is useful to examine the function of sanpo using a quantitative methodology.  
As stated in the previous sections, as the major expected functions of sanpo were 
moderating industrial relations and enhancing productivity, we will focus on these two 
functions. In relation to industrial relations, we have theoretical and empirical 
literature on labor disputes. Most of the literature focuses on collective bargaining by 
trade unions, in particular, on the conditions that make bargaining result in disputes40. 
The key variables include inflation rate, growth rate of real wages and tightness of the 
labor market. The assumption is that a high inflation rate, low real wage growth and a 
tight labor market lead to trade unions adopting a more aggressive approach that raises 
the probability of a dispute occurring, and vise versa. Based on this framework, we 
analyze the labor disputes in wartime Japan to evaluate the function of sanpo.    
       Whereas firm level data on labor disputes are not available for the wartime 
period, we have monthly prefecture level data on the number of disputes as well as the 
number of participants in disputes contained in several issues of the Rodo Jiho (Labor 
Bulletin) released by the Ministry of Welfare.  Also, semiannual prefecture level data 
on the labor force are available from the same source.   Dividing the number of dispute 
participants in each prefecture by the total number of non-agricultural workers in the 
same prefecture41, we have the dispute participation ratio. The prefectural data on the 
days lost are not available.  The participation ratio reflects frequency and scale of 
disputes, and not their duration. In other words, the analysis using the participation 
ratio captures how well sanpo functioned to prevent disputes in advance42.   
                                                  
38 Hassoden, vol.1-5, September 1941, p.10. 
39 Ibid, vol.1-6, October 1941, p.10. 
40 Tracy, “An Investigation”; Vroman, “A Longitudinal Analysis; Ohtake and Tracy, “The 
Determinants.”  
41 Forestry and fishery workers are also excluded, but we refer to this group as the 
non-agricultural labor force for the sake of simplicity. 
42 This attribute might be desirable to elucidate the function of sanpo, because during 
the war, the police authorities actively intervened in disputes, and therefore their 
duration was influenced by such intervention (Rodo Jiho, 1940 extra issue, p.19). While 
the percentage of disputes in which the police authorities intervened to mediate was 
7.3%. in 1930, the percentage was 55.9% in 1940 (Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo, vol. 10, 
p.518).    The police intervention is reflected in the decline in dispute duration.    While 
the percentage of strikes which were resolved within four days was 20.5% in 1930, the 
percentage was 81.9% in 1940. (Ibid, p.489). This is a major reason why the days lost did 
not go up in 1939 and 1940, while the number of disputes and participants increased 
(Figure 2).    It is true that the number of disputes and participants might be influenced 
 12 The panel data on the dispute participation ratio for 47 prefectures * 4 
semiannual periods from 1940.1-6 to 1941.7-12 (DISPUTE) are constructed. We regress 
DISPUTE to standard variables affecting labor dispute, namely, inflation rate, growth 
rate of real wages, and tightness of the labor market, as well as a variable that captures 
the extent of the influence of sanpo. Tightness of the labor market is measured by 
growth rate of the non-agricultural workers in each prefecture (GLABOR). Consumer 
price and real wages are taken from Chingin Tokei (Wage Statistics) and Rodo Tokei 
Geppo  (Monthly Labor Statistics) released by the Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 
Office 43 . Inflation rate (INFLA) and growth rate of real wages (GRWAGE) are 
calculated from these data. INFLA and GRWAGE are district level semiannual panel 
data44. We assume that INFLA and GRWAGE were the same in the prefectures in each 
district. As a sanpo variable we use the ratio of non-agricultural sanpo members to the 
total non-agricultural workers in each prefecture at the end of each semiannual period 
(SANPO). SANPO is prefecture level semiannual panel data.  Sanpo  member data are 




+ΣatPERIODt+ΣaiPREFEi+ei t ,                                            (1) 
 
MALE, PERIOD and PREFE refer to the ratio of male workers, the semiannual period 
dummies, and the prefecture dummies, respectively, and e is an error term45.  The 
subscript i indicates prefecture and t indicates period.  PERIOD captures the macro 
                                                                                                                                                  
by police intervention as well.    In fact, it was the intention of the police authorities to 
prevent disputes in advance (mizen boshi), and disputes prevented (mizen boshi sogi) 
were not counted in the dispute statistics.    However, at least a percentage of mizen 
boshi could be attributed to the influence of sanpo. The Police Bureau of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs wrote that the sanpo movement contributed to obviation (mizen boshi) of 
disputes (The Police Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Shakai Undo no Jokyo., 
1940, p.914. Also, see Labor Bureau of Ministry of Welfare, Rodo Jiho, August 1941, 
p.274). On the other hand, it may represent another possible bias in the dispute 
statistics, namely a change in how thoroughly all disputes were (I owe this point to an 
anonymous referee).    As the government authorities became more concerned about 
labor disputes, smaller disputes might come to be detected and counted. It is difficult to 
confirm this possibility, but at least the average number of participants did not decline 
substantially until 1943 (Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo, vol. 10, op cit. p.440).                 
43 Chingin Tokei was succeeded by Rodo Tokei Geppo in September 1939. 
44 The districts comprise Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku-Shikoku 
and Kyushu. 
45 Currie and Ferrie, “ The Law and Labor Strife” analyzed the effect of legal 
innovations on labor disputes, using U.S. state-level data       
 13 shocks across all the prefectures.  Therefore, the rise and fall of the patriotic mood is 
captured by this variable, so long as it was a nation-wide phenomenon.    Out of the total 
188 observations (47 prefectures * 4 semiannual periods), the 7 observations where 
SANPO>1 were excluded.  Basic statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. 
Because DISPUTE is zero for 41 observations, we estimate equation (1) using the Tobit 
model46. 
     The results are reported in Table 3.  In equation (1)-1, a1 is negative as expected, 
but not statistically significant.  a4 and a5 are positive and statistically significant as 
expected, while a2 and a3 are not significant.  The reason why a2 is insignificant is 
considered to be the correlation between INFLA and the period dummies.  That is, as 
the cross-sectional variance of inflation rates is not large enough, the effect of inflation 
rate is absorbed by the period dummies.  In fact, in equation (1)-2, where we exclude 
the period dummies, a2 is positive and strongly significant.  The positive impact of 
inflation on disputes is consistent with the observations for the days cited in section 2. 
In equation (1)-3, the interaction terms SANPO and PERIOD were added.  This was 
done to take into account the possibility that the effect of sanpo on labor disputes 
changed over time.   
    In  this  equation,  a1 coefficient is positive but not significant. On the other hand, the 
interaction term with the period dummy for the second half of 1940 and first half of 
1941 are negative and significant.  Also, the sum of a1 and the coefficient of each of 
these interaction terms are negative. These results imply that sanpo contributed to 
reducing the participation of workers in labor disputes. One might suspect that high 
SANPO captures some other attributes which reduced labor disputes. In other words, 
SANPO is an endogenous variable. For example, in prefectures where industrial 
relations were good, SANPO would be high and at the same time DISPUTE would be 
low.  However, as equation (1) includes the fixed effect of prefecture (PREFE), such 
prefecture-specific factors correlating with SANPO as well as DISPUTE are controlled 
for.    The estimation result that the sanpo participation ratio was negatively associated 
with dispute participation ratio in 1940 and 1941 is consistent with the observation by 
Kikukawa cited in the previous section.   
     Next,  we  examine  the  effect  of  sanpo on firm productivity.    For this purpose, firm 
or establishment information on sanpo is necessary. Fortunately, Rodo Jiho records the 
name and the founding date of each sanpo unit established from July 1938 to July 1939 
                                                  
46 Whereas this specification does not explicitly take into account the decline of skills 
due to mobilization of the labor force, skill level change across the firms is controlled for 
by the month dummies. 
 14 by establishment or firm. Matching this data with other relevant firm or establishment 
data, we can analyze the effect of sanpo on productivity. 
          There are few industries for which detailed firm or establishment production data 
are available at frequent time intervals.  One of them is the cotton spinning industry.  
Monthly firm production data, number of operating machines, consumption of raw 
cotton, and number of workers by sex can be found in Dainihon Meishi Boseki Rengokai 
Geppo (Monthly Bulletin of Japan Cotton Spinning Association). To standardize for any 
sex-related efficiency discrepancy we converted male workers into female workers based 
on the wage ratio (the male wage/the female wage).  The monthly wage data on the 
cotton spinning industry by sex are collected from Rodo Tokei (Labor Statistics) by the 
Bank of Japan47.  The monthly data on working hours in the cotton spinning industry 
are also taken from Rodo Tokei. Using these data, we derived the following 
Cobb-Douglas type production function, to examine whether sanpo shifted the function 
or  not.   
 
log(Yit)=b0+b1SANPOit-1+b2log(Kit)+b3log(LHit)+b4log(Rit)+ΣbtMONTHt
+ΣbiFIRMi+eit                                                 ( 2 )  
 
Y, K, LH and M denote production of cotton yarn, number of operating machines, input 
of labor (man-hour) and consumption of raw cotton, respectively.  MONTH is the 
month dummies, and FIRM is the firm dummies.  SANPOit-1 is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if there was a sanpo unit in firm i at the end of month t-1, and 0 
otherwise.  If b1 is positive, sanpo brought about an upward shift in the production 
function, or in other words, sanpo enhanced the total factor productivity (TFP).     
          The sample used was 59 firms whose production data were continuously available 
from January 1938 to December 1939.  Concerning these firms we constructed panel 
data from January 1938 to August 1939.  Figure 4 shows the number of firms with 
sanpo units in the 59 sample firms.  As stated in section 2, the government started to 
promote the establishment of sanpo units in August 1938.  In fact, from that date, the 
cotton spinning firms with sanpo units increased sharply.  The basic statistics and 
estimation results of equation (2) are reported in Table 4 and Table 5.  We include the 
fixed effect of firm in equation (2).    This is to resolve the endogeneity problem. In other 
words, firm-specific factors which correlated with SANPO as well as productivity, 
including the quality of management, are controlled for by the fixed effect. The 
coefficient b1 is positive and statistically significant with a value of 0.039, implying that 
                                                  
47 Reprinted in Nihon Keieishi Kenkyujo ed, Rodo Tokei. 
 15 sanpo increased TFP by 3.9%.     
 
5. Concluding Remarks   
Many articles and books have been written on sanpo.    However, there has been 
no attempt to evaluate sanpo quantitatively.  As mentioned in section 1, most of the 
recent literature has evaluated the function of sanpo in negative terms, but they have 
basically relied on a small number of case studies or negative contemporary 
observations.  But, as discussed in section 3, there is a significant body of anecdotal 
evidence which indicates that sanpo had substantial positive effects in terms of 
preventing labor disputes and enhancing efficiency.  In order to finally resolve this 
question, quantitative examinations are necessary.  This paper is the first attempt to 
do this. 
 According to the analysis of prefectural data, sanpo reduced the level of 
participation in labor disputes until around 1941, and enhanced labor productivity until 
1942. Also, estimating production function by monthly firm level data from the cotton 
spinning industry, we found that sanpo increased TFP by 3.9%.  In this paper, these 
results were interpreted within a framework that integrated the voice view of unionism 
advanced by Freeman et al. and transaction cost economics.  The effects of sanpo 
confirmed in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that sanpo provided the 
workers with a collective voice.    The significance of this collective voice mechanism was 
arguably greater in wartime Japan, because inter-firm labor transfers were regulated 
and at the same time employees were trained to become skilled workers with 
“intellectual skill” inside each firm.     
The wartime government intervention in industrial relations in Japan was unique, 
when we compare this with what occurred in Britain.  In Britain, a well-established 
mechanism for collective bargaining between trade unions and employers already 
existed when the Second World War broke out, and the role of the government was 
basically to supplement its function, typically through compulsory arbitration according 
to Order 130548.  On the other hand, as stated in section 2, in pre-war Japan the 
proportion of workers who participated in collective bargaining, was very small. Put 
another way, Japan was in a far earlier stage in the development of collective 
                                                  
48 Jaffe, “The Ambiguities” (An anonymous referee told me about this article); G.D.H. 
Cole,  A Short History, p.458; Wrigley, “The Second World War”; Pelling, A History, 
pp.220-221. 
   
 
 16 bargaining.    Thus, introducing a voice mechanism for employees was one of the central 
issues of Japan’s wartime labor policy.  As a result of the policy promotion, the voice 
mechanism diffused into Japanese industrial relations to a significant degree for the 
first time, and the mechanism, sanpo, functioned to mitigate disputes and enhance 
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Figure 4 Number of cotton spinning firms with sanpo units in the samplesTable 1 Frequency of sanpo meetings
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observations of




1938 before Oct. 75 10 21.3 ･･･
Nov. 72 4 20.2 0.297
Dec. 57 3 21.0 0.389
1939 Jan. 44 1 11.3 0.263
Feb. 111 11 35.6 0.356
Mar. 64 6 19.3 0.332
Apr. 72 5 27.1 0.404
May 68 6 26.6 0.428
Jun. 57 4 23.5 0.443
Jul. 56 9 23.0 0.489
Aug. 75 7 34.3 0.505
Sep. 72 1 35.6 0.501
Total/average 823 67 25.2 0.402
Source: The Labor Policy Section, the Bureau of Labor, the Ministry of Welfare, "Sangyo Hokokukai
   no Sishiki Katsudo Jokyo sono 1," (The organization and activities of sanpo, 1), September 1940.
Month of establishmentTable 2 Basic statistics on labor disputes
DISPUTE MALE(-1) SANPO(-1) INFLA GRWAGE GLABOR
Average 0.00301 0.685 0.621 0.102 0.002 0.059
Stdev. 0.00613 0.117 0.179 0.123 0.064 0.149
Max. 0.06366 0.904 0.995 0.293 0.125 0.632
Min. 0.00000 0.373 0.163 -0.078 -0.103 -0.368




Constant -0.01860 （-0.918） -0.0220 (-1.077) -0.00913 （-0.469）
SANPO(-1) -0.00094 （-0.165） -0.0047 (-0.859) 0.00717 （1.173)
INFLA -0.01090 (-0.170) 0.0665 (3.179) *** 0.01280 (0.208)
GRWAGE -0.00197 (-0.0349) 0.0272 (1.552) 0.01420 (0.262)
GLABOR 0.00936 (1.867) * 0.0099 (1.963) ** 0.00335 (0.588)
MALE(-1) 0.06510 （2.446） ** 0.0608 (2.283) ** 0.05090 (1.970) **
1940L -0.00298 （-0.961） 0.00846 (1.499)
1941F -0.00656 （-1.310） 0.00802 (1.241)
1941L -0.00859 （-1.500） -0.01310 (-1.520)
SANPO(-1)*1940L -0.01580 (-2.381) **
SANPO(-1)*1941F -0.02020 (-3.291) ***
SANPO(-1)*1941L 0.00628 (0.714)
Prefecture dummies YES YES YES
Log of Likelihood 516.148 513.784
Obs. 181 181 181
Positive obs. 140 140 140
Note: See the text.  t-values are in parentheses.
        *** statistically significant at 1% level
        **   statistically significant at 5% level                                       
        *     statistically significant at 10% levelTable 4 Basic Statistics on production function of cotton spinnig industry
ln(Y) ln（K） ln(LH) ln(R) SANPO
Average 4.913 4.705 12.586 4.966 0.303
Stdev 0.581 0.593 1.132 0.576 0.460
Max 6.357 6.270 15.454 6.409 1.000
Min 3.522 3.240 10.404 3.625 0.000











Note：See the text.  T-values by White heteroscedasticity robust estimator of standard deviation are in parentheses.
        Month dummies and firm dummies are included, although not reported.